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Abstract: There is a growing consensus that norms matter for ordinary causal attributions.  
This has important implications for philosophical debates over actual causation. Many hold that 
theories of actual causation should coincide with ordinary causal attributions, yet those 
attributions often diverge from the theories when norms are involved. There remains substantive 
debate about why norms matter for causal attributions, however. In this paper, I consider two 
competing explanations—Alicke’s bias view, which holds that the impact of norms reflects 
systematic error (suggesting that ordinary causal attributions should be ignored in the 
philosophical debates), and our responsibility view, which holds that the impact of norms reflects 
the appropriate application of the ordinary concept of causation (suggesting that philosophical 
accounts are not analyzing the ordinary concept). I investigate one key difference between these 
views: the bias view, but not the responsibility view, predicts that “peripheral features” of the 
agents in causal scenarios—features that are irrelevant to appropriately assessing responsibility 
for an outcome, such as general character—will also impact ordinary causal attributions. These 
competing predictions are tested for two different types of scenarios. I find that information 
about an agent’s character does not impact causal attributions on its own. Rather, when character 
shows an effect it works through inferences to relevant features of the agent. In one scenario this 
involves inferences to the agent’s knowledge of the likely result of her action and her desire to 
bring about that result, with information about knowledge and desire each showing an 
independent effect on causal attributions. 
 
 
 
An expanding body of evidence indicates that norms, especially injunctive norms, matter for 
ordinary causal attributions.2 This has notable implications for philosophical debates concerning 
actual causation. Many participants in this debate are committed to what Livengood et al. (2017) 
term the folk attribution desideratum (FAD): they hold that an important measure of the 
 
1 I want to thank Jonathan Livengood for extremely helpful feedback on previous drafts of this paper. I would also 
like to thank the audience at the University of Waikato. 
2 See Hilton and Slugoski (1986), Alicke (1992), Knobe and Fraser (2008), Hitchcock and Knobe (2009), Sytsma et 
al. (2012), Reuter et al. (2014), Kominsky et al. (2015), Livengood et al. (2017), Icard et al. (2017), Rose (2017), 
Kominsky and Phillips (2019), and Livengood and Sytsma (forthcoming), among others. By “ordinary causal 
attributions” I specifically mean the use of language like “X caused Y.” Some researchers arguably go further than 
this, holding that norms matter not just for ordinary causal attributions, but for causal cognition more generally 
(Danks et al., 2014). I will restrict myself to the narrower claim, however. In addition, I will focus on just injunctive 
norms, which I take to include both prescriptive norms (what should be done) and proscriptive norms (what should 
not be done). In the existing literature, the phrase “prescriptive norm” is often used to refer to both prescriptive and 
proscriptive norms. 
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acceptability of theories of actual causation is how well they accord with ordinary causal 
attributions about specific cases. The empirical literature shows, however, that ordinary causal 
attributions often diverge from the verdicts of philosophical theories for scenarios involving 
norm violations (e.g., Livengood et al. 2017, Rose 2017, Livengood and Sytsma forthcoming), 
raising a problem for theorists embracing the FAD.  
 One prominent explanation of the role of norms in ordinary causal attributions—the bias 
view put forward by Alicke and colleagues—holds that their impact owes to a systematic 
performance error, with the desire to blame biasing otherwise descriptive causal judgments.3 
Rose (2017) has recently drawn out the implications of this view for the philosophical debates, 
putting forward a debunking explanation of ordinary causal attributions. He concludes that “in 
the dispute over actual causation, folk intuitions deserve to be rejected” (1323). With regard to 
judgments about agents, this follows from the view that the problematic intuitions are the result 
of bias.4 In contrast, our competing responsibility view holds that the impact of norms issues not 
from bias, but from the correct application of the ordinary concept of causation at play in causal 
attributions.5 If this is correct, then insofar as the dispute over actual causation concerns the 
ordinary concept, folk intuitions should not be ignored.6 
 
3 See Alicke (1992, 2000), Alicke and Rose (2010), Alicke et al. (2011), Rose (2017). 
4 While Rose offers a two-pronged debunking argument, calling on the bias view with regard to judgments about 
agents and a separate process based on primitive teleological considerations for judgments about non-agents, I’ll 
focus on just judgments about agents here. In doing so, it is worth noting that one prong of Rose’s argument could 
hold without the other. For instance, it could be that people make a mistake in applying the ordinary concept of 
causation to non-agents, and yet apply it appropriately in making judgments about agents. This would not warrant 
the conclusion that folk intuitions in general should be rejected in thinking about actual causation, however, but 
rather that insofar as the debates over actual causation concern the ordinary concept of causation, our theories should 
be restricted to agents. 
5 See Sytsma et al. (2012), Livengood et al. (2017), Sytsma et al. (2019), Livengood and Sytsma (forthcoming), 
Sytsma (under review a, b), Sytsma and Livengood (under review). 
6 As argued in Livengood and Sytsma (forthcoming), this is not the only motivation for work on actual causation. 
And we suggest that “philosophers may accept or reject the FAD to differing degrees with respect to different 
projects.” While many researchers aim to provide a description or analysis of the ordinary concept, for which the 
FAD would seem non-negotiable, others might be better described as engaging in conceptual engineering or in 
trying to figure out what causation really is. For the conceptual engineer, divergence from lay intuitions is to be 
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 Not surprisingly, the bias and responsibility views make the same predictions about most 
cases that have been investigated in the empirical literature. The central examples involve 
scenarios where two agents jointly bring about a bad outcome, with one agent violating an 
explicit injunctive norm while the other does not. For such cases, participants are more likely to 
treat the agent who violates the norm as the cause of the outcome than the agent who does not 
violate the norm. And a comparable effect is found when there is just a single agent bringing 
about the outcome—that agent being treated as more causal in scenarios where she violates a 
norm than in scenarios where she does not (Livengood et al. 2017). Both the bias view and the 
responsibility view can readily explain these results, the former holding that they reflect that 
norm violations bias ordinary causal attributions, the latter that they reflect the appropriate 
application of a normative concept. 
 As discussed in Livengood and Sytsma (forthcoming), deciding between the bias and 
responsibility views poses the challenge of distinguishing between the systematic misapplication 
of a concept and the correct application of an alternative concept. In that paper, we argue that the 
bias view would require a self-underminingly large bias to explain the empirical results, and that 
both charity and simplicity favor the responsibility view. In the present paper I expand on this, 
offering empirical evidence bearing directly on the dispute. I test a key point of divergence 
between the two accounts: while both the bias and responsibility views expect that various 
features of an agent’s mental states that are relevant to assessing responsibility for the outcome 
will impact ordinary causal attributions, the bias view goes further, holding that purely peripheral 
 
expected, although an understanding of the ordinary concept is likely to be useful for this project. For realist 
metaphysics, the FAD is likely to be reasonable only insofar as it raises worries about having changed the topic and 
corresponding worries about motivating the topic. Given that the motivation for Rose’s debunking argument is tied 
to the assumption that “fit with folk intuitions of actual causation is taken to serve as an important desideratum in 
evaluating theories of actual causation” (2017, 1325), I will assume a motivation that implies the FAD for present 
purposes. 
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features of the agent—features that are irrelevant to appropriately assessing responsibility, such 
as the agent’s general character—will also impact causal attributions. In contrast, while the 
responsibility view allows that people will sometimes show bias, we expect that features that are 
irrelevant to appropriately assessing responsibility should not have a major impact on ordinary 
causal attributions.  
Here is how I will proceed. In Section 1, I briefly lay out the bias and responsibility 
views. In Section 2, I consider a previous experiment in the literature—the first study in Alicke 
(1992)—that bears on the role of character in ordinary causal attributions. I explore this case 
further in Section 3, conducting two follow-up experiments. The results suggest that character 
does not have an independent effect; rather, in this case participants draw an inference from 
character to negligence. In Section 4, I investigate the role of character for a different type of 
scenario, building off the findings of Livengood et al. (2017). The results again suggest that 
character does not have an independent effect, instead this time working through inferences to 
the agent’s knowledge and desire in performing their action. I then explore the relative roles of 
knowledge and desire on causal attributions, finding that each has an impact, although what 
impact they have is complicated by further inferences. I conclude that the present evidence 
favors the responsibility view over the bias view, casting doubt on Rose’s debunking argument. 
 
1. Bias and Responsibility 
In this section I discuss two competing accounts of the impact of norms on ordinary causal 
attributions—the bias view and the responsibility view—focusing on one key difference: the bias 
view, but not the responsibility view, expects that peripheral features of the agent will also have 
a notable impact on causal attributions. 
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The responsibility view holds that the concept of causation that lay people typically 
employ when they make causal attributions has a normative component.7 The basic claim is that 
causal attributions serve to indicate more than that an agent contributed to bringing about an 
outcome—they also give a normative evaluation of the action akin to saying that the agent is 
responsible or accountable for the outcome. As such, the responsibility view offers a direct 
explanation of the effect of norms on ordinary causal attributions: norms play a role because the 
concept at play is in part normative.8 One upshot of this view is that the impact of norms does 
not reflect bias or error; rather, people are correctly applying the relevant concept. Given that the 
resulting causal attributions often diverge from those given by philosophical accounts of actual 
causation, the implication is that philosophers are either making a mistake in applying the 
ordinary concept or else tapping judgments about a different concept, then mistakenly taking that 
concept to be the ordinary concept at play in causal attributions.  
 The responsibility view holds that factors beyond just the agent’s action and the outcome 
she contributes to will often matter for causal attributions, since they often matter for 
responsibility judgments. This includes factors concerning the agent’s mental states, such as 
whether she knew about the norm (or should have known this), whether she knew that her action 
would contribute to the outcome (or should have known this), whether she desired to violate the 
 
7 To put this more carefully, “people” should be restricted throughout to native English-speaking adult Americans—
the population that most of the participants in the relevant studies have been drawn from (but see Samland and 
Waldmann 2016 for similar findings using a more geographically diverse sample; see Samland et al. 2016 for 
findings on children). The extent to which these findings generalize to other English-speakers and, especially, to 
attributions in other languages remains an interesting open question. 
8 The responsibility view is similar to the pragmatic view put forward by Samland and Waldmann (2015, 2016), 
although they make a subtly different claim. Samland and Waldmann’s view is that the causal queries used in the 
empirical literature are often ambiguous and that pragmatic features of the probes tend to lead participants to 
interpret the questions as asking about accountability rather than descriptive causation. The responsibility account 
goes further than this, asserting that the “accountability” usage of the language of causal attribution is the dominant 
use. In other words, contra Samland and Waldmann, we do not believe that pragmatic features of the experimental 
setups are shifting participants away from a descriptive reading of “caused” that they are otherwise likely to employ; 
rather, we propose that these probes are accurately eliciting judgments about the applicability of the ordinary 
concept of causation at play in causal attributions. See Sytsma et al. (2019) for corpus evidence supporting this 
claim. 
 6
norm, and whether she desired for the outcome to occur. For instance, the reasoning behind a key 
prediction in Sytsma et al. (2012, 816) included that “the agent could reasonably be expected to 
know that a bad outcome might result from her behavior.” Our expectation was that many factors 
go into assessing responsibility for an outcome, including most prominently whether it is judged 
that an agent foresaw, or should have foreseen, that her action would contribute to the outcome 
and whether she desired to bring about the outcome. Further, a good deal of empirical evidence 
suggests that such factors impact responsibility attributions and related judgments (e.g., 
Cushman 2008, Gailey and Falk 2008, Lagnado and Channon 2008, Malle et al. 2014, Young 
and Saxe 2011, Samland and Waldmann 2016).  
In addition, there is some existing evidence that mental state factors matter for ordinary 
causal attributions. For instance, Samland and Waldmann (2016) test the agent’s knowledge of 
the norm that is violated. In their fourth experiment they use a cover story in which a gardener 
(Benni) uses a fertilizer he shouldn’t have, leading to some plants drying up. In one condition, 
Benni uses the illicit fertilizer intentionally, knowing the rule against doing so; in a second 
condition, he uses the illicit fertilizer accidently; in a third condition, he uses the fertilizer 
intentionally but doesn’t know about the rule against doing so; and, in the fourth condition, he is 
tricked into using the fertilizer. When Samland and Waldmann asked which agent caused the 
outcome, they found that a large majority of participants selected Benni in the first condition, but 
that this decreased dramatically in the other three conditions, with only a small minority 
selecting Benni in the fourth condition.9 And Kirfel and Lagnado (2017) present evidence that 
 
9 This study has been successfully replicated by Kominsky and Phillips (2019), who advocate for another view in the 
literature—the counterfactual view (Hitchcock and Knobe 2009, Kominsky et al. 2015, Icard et al. 2017, Kominsky 
and Phillips 2019). While Samland and Waldman take their results to push against the counterfactual view, 
Kominsky and Phillips argue that the counterfactual view is also able to explain the findings. In brief, the 
counterfactual view holds that the effect of norms works through making the counterfactual on which the norm 
wasn’t violated more salient. Kominsky and Phillips then expand on this, suggesting that information about an 
agent’s mental states can affect whether the agent is taken to have violated a norm. Specifically, they focus on 
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the agents’ knowledge of the likely outcome of their action also matters for ordinary causal 
attributions. In two experiments they found that causal attributions were higher when the agents 
knew about the likely outcome of their actions than when they did not know about the likely 
outcome of their actions. 
 
1.2 Bias 
The bias view put forward by Alicke and colleagues—otherwise referred to as the culpable 
control model or blame validation account—sees the process of making causal attributions as 
one in which the desire to blame biases otherwise descriptive causal judgments. The basic idea is 
that ordinary causal attributions are often implicitly shaped to rationalize or validate our desires 
to blame or praise. Thus, Alicke et al. (2011, 670) write that “when people are asked to identify, 
for example, the primary cause of an event, they accord privileged status to actions that arouse 
positive or negative evaluations”; this has the result that “causal attributions reflect a desire to 
praise or denigrate those whose actions we applaud or deride.” As such, the bias view holds that 
the impact of norms is the result of people making a mistake in applying the ordinary concept of 
causation. As Rose (2017, 1327, italics in original) puts it, “on this view, the effect of moral 
considerations on folk intuitions of actual causation is an error, rooted in a motivational bias to 
blame those who engage in harmful or offensive actions.” If we also assume that the judgments 
of philosophers about causal scenarios are generally free from this bias, then we would have 
reason to favor philosophical intuitions in analyzing the ordinary concept of causation. 
 Like the responsibility view, the bias view does not hold that norm violations are the only 
thing that will matter for ordinary causal attributions. The bias view allows that mental state 
 
whether the agent knew and/or desired to violate the norm. While I will not focus on the counterfactual view in this 
paper, it is unclear how readily this view can explain the new results reported in Section 4, which focus on whether 
the agent knew and/or desired to bring about the outcome. 
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factors like those discussed above might play a role in people’s desire to blame or praise an 
agent, which would then impact their causal attributions. The bias view goes further than this, 
however, also holding that “peripheral features” of the agent (Alicke et al. 2011)—features that 
arouse negative/positive evaluations but are not relevant to appropriately assessing the agent’s 
responsibility for the outcome—should impact causal attributions. They hold that such 
evaluations can occur in response to features directly relevant to the outcome and how it came 
about, but also in response to “peripheral features of the event such as the actor’s or victim’s race 
or character” (674). If peripheral features of the agent, such as her general character, have a 
notable impact on ordinary causal attributions, it seems this would be best understood in terms of 
bias, and as a result would favor the bias view over the responsibility view.  
 
2. Motive and Character 
Most of the cases tested in the empirical literature manipulate whether or not an agent violates a 
norm. The first case tested by Alicke (1992), however, is a bit different. The scenario he used 
involves a driver (John) who violates an injunctive norm (drives 40 mph in a 30-mph zone) and 
hits another car. The manipulation of interest for present purposes doesn’t directly involve this 
norm violation, however, but John’s motive for violating it. In one set of conditions John’s 
motive was good (he was speeding “in order to get home in time to hide an anniversary present 
for his parents that he had left out in the open before they could see it”) and in the other set of 
conditions his motive was bad (he was speeding “in order to get home in time to hide a vial of 
cocaine he had left out in the open before his parents could see it”). Alicke found that people 
were more likely to answer that John was the primary cause of an accident when he had a bad 
motive than when he had a good motive.  
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Alicke also varied a second contributing cause. Participants were either told that there 
was an oil spill on the road, that a tree branch was blocking the stop sign, or that the other car ran 
a stop sign. For present purposes, the first version is most relevant, since the link from the norm 
violation to the outcome is the clearest. In the oil spill conditions, John “applied his brakes, but 
was unable to stop as quickly as usual because of some oil that had spilled on the road.” The 
result was that “John hit a car that was coming from the other direction… on the driver’s side, 
causing him multiple lacerations, a broken collar bone, and a fractured arm.” In the oil spill 
conditions, participants were notably more likely to cite John as the primary cause of the 
accident in a sentence completion task when he had a bad motive (96.6%) than when he had a 
good motive (65.5%), and a similar gap was seen for responsibility ratings, causal ratings, and 
the amount of compensation that participants thought the other driver deserved. 
At first glance, these results plausibly support the bias view over the responsibility 
view.10 John’s motive for speeding is arguably informing participants about a peripheral feature 
of the agent—his general character. Based on just the information provided in the vignettes, in 
one condition John would seem to be a good son, in the other a bad son. And if such peripheral 
features have a significant effect on causal attributions, this would be evidence in favor of the 
 
10 In fact, this is the first piece of evidence that Rose (2017) notes in support of the bias view and the first prong of 
his debunking argument. He also cites the causal modeling work conducted by Alicke et al. (2011) and our joint 
work in Sytsma et al. (2012) in responding to the counterfactual view, although interestingly he doesn’t note the 
alternative responsibility view that we first put forward in that paper. The relevant study from Alicke et al. is Study 
3, which involves a man named Poole entering Turnbull’s house and being shot. The key manipulation for our 
purposes is whether Poole was described as a dangerous ex-convict who broke into Turnbull’s home or a physician 
who Turnbull’s wife had asked to feed her cat while she was away. Alicke et al. found that ratings for both a causal 
attribution and a blame attribution were higher in the former condition than the latter. While they describe this 
manipulation in terms of Turnbull’s “character,” it is rather clear that the description is relevant to assessing Poole’s 
culpability: one is surely more warranted in shooting a dangerous convict who has broken into your house than 
someone who was invited into the home and is doing a homeowner a favor. As such, these findings do not suggest 
against the responsibility view. Alicke et al. also detail two statistical analyses suggesting that the best model of the 
relationship is that blame judgments cause causal judgments. This includes that blame mediates the effects of the 
manipulation on causal ratings. Again, these findings do not suggest against the responsibility view, which expects 
the effect of the description of Poole to impact causal attributions through their relevance to assessing responsibility. 
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bias view. Arguably, neither motive for John’s speeding should notably mitigate his 
responsibility for the outcome, although a story to that effect could perhaps be constructed.  
It is not clear that John’s motives in Alicke’s scenarios can simply be treated as 
informing on peripheral features of the agent, however. The reason is that John’s motive seems 
relevant for purposes of inferring something about John’s skill as a driver, which is not a 
peripheral feature of the agent, at least with regard to assessing whether he caused a car crash. 
For instance, rushing home to hide a vial of cocaine that had been left out in the open suggests a 
serious drug problem, and a serious drug problem raises questions about that person’s driving 
ability. As Malle et al. (2014, 163) put the point: “in real life an agent’s goals (and inferred 
character) may provide preventability information: for example, that the drug-hiding agent was 
driving faster, was more inattentive, and more careless than the gift-hiding agent, warranting 
greater causality and blame judgments.” One way to assess whether the effect on causal 
attributions seen in Alicke’s driver experiment reflects participants’ negative evaluations of the 
driver’s character or whether participants instead draw an inference to his driving ability, is to 
modify the case so that the driver’s character is indicated in a way that does not as clearly 
suggest an inference to driving ability. This was the goal of my first set of studies. 
 
3. Driver Studies 
To better test whether participants’ judgments in Alicke’s (1992) driver experiment reflect bias 
or an inference to driving ability, I ran two studies using simplified versions of his vignettes. In 
the first I varied information pertinent to assessing the driver’s character. In the second I varied 
information directly pertaining to her driving ability. 
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3.1 Study 1 
In my first study, participants were given one of two scenarios describing a driver (Samantha) 
who hits another vehicle.11 Samantha was either described in a way intended to generate a 
positive assessment of her (“Samantha likes to tutor underprivileged children in her spare time”) 
or a negative assessment of her (“Samantha likes to torture cats in her spare time”), but where 
neither description would seem to warrant a direct inference about her driving ability. In both 
scenarios Samantha was then described as being involved in a car accident while driving home 
from work. Participants were told that “Samantha hit the other driver on the driver’s side, 
causing him multiple lacerations, a broken collar bone, and a fractured arm.” After reading the 
vignette, participants were asked to “Complete the following sentence: The primary cause of this 
accident was ___________.” On a second page, participants were asked to rate their agreement 
with each of two claims—“Samantha was responsible for the accident” and “Samantha caused 
the accident”— using a 7-point scale anchored at 1 with “totally disagree,” at 4 with “neither 
agree nor disagree,” and at 7 with “totally agree.” Finally, participants were asked about 
compensation: 
The law allows between $0 and $100,000 to be awarded to the victim in an automobile 
collision. In cases such as this, if Samantha were believed to be at fault, the average 
award would be about $25,000. How much money, if any, do you think should be 
awarded to the driver that Samantha hit? 
 
The vignette was repeated on the second page and participants were not able to go back to the 
first page. Responses for Study 1 were collected from 132 participants.12 
 
11 Full vignettes for each study in this paper are given in the supplemental materials. 
12 Participants for each study presented in this paper were recruited through advertising for a free personality test on 
Google. Prior to the causal scenario, participants answered basic demographic questions. After the causal scenarios 
they took a 10-item Big Five personality inventory. Participants for each study were restricted to native English-
speakers, 16 years of age or older. Participants for Study 1 were 64.4% women with an average age 35.7 years and 
ranging in age from 16 to 71. Given the higher percentage of woman, I checked for gender effects on participant 
responses. One-way ANOVAs showed no significant gender effects on responsibility ratings, causal ratings, or 
compensation. 
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Figure 1: Results of Study 1 showing 95% confidence intervals; histograms of responses 
shown above. 
 
 
 
Results are shown in Figure 1. There was no significant difference between the two 
conditions in how often participants identified Samantha as the primary cause, in mean 
agreement with the responsibility claim, or in mean agreement with the causal claim.13 In other 
words, whether Samantha was described in a way indicating that she is a good or a bad person 
had no notable effect on participants’ causal judgments. As such, it might be worried that the 
descriptions used simply did not elicit positive/negative evaluations of Samantha from 
participants, despite their rather extreme nature. Responses to the compensation question indicate 
that this is not the case, however. While the description of Samantha had no effect on causal 
 
13 Primary Cause: χ2(1)=0.13, p=0.71. Responsibility Rating: t(129.69)=0.42, p=0.67, d=0.072; W=2197.5, p=0.86. 
Causal Rating: t(129.72)=0.046, p=0.96, d=0.0080; W=2160.5, p=1. 
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judgments, it had a notable effect on how much compensation participants thought the other 
driver deserved. In the condition where Samantha was described as torturing cats, the average 
compensation assigned was 71.7% higher than when she was described as tutoring 
underprivileged children, and the difference was statistically significant.14 This indicates that 
participants were in fact forming positive/negative evaluations of Samantha even though these 
evaluations had no notable effect on their causal attributions.  
  
  
3.2 Study 2 
In my second study, participants were given one of two new variations on the scenarios from 
Study 1. This time, instead of describing Samantha in ways intended to generate positive or 
negative assessments of her, I directly stated that she was either a good driver (“Samantha is a 
very safe and attentive driver”) or a bad driver (“Samantha is a very unsafe and inattentive 
driver”). Samantha was again described as being involved in a car accident while driving home 
from work and participants were asked the same four questions as in the previous study. 
Responses were collected from 138 participants.15 
Results are shown in Figure 2. This time there were significant differences between the 
two conditions for each of the four questions, with responses being higher when Samantha was 
described as bad driver compared to when she was described as a good driver.16 Comparing the 
two studies, whether Samantha was described in ways indicating that she is a good or a bad 
person had no notable effect on participants’ causal judgments, but whether she was said to be a 
 
14 t(128.13)=3.44, p=0.00078, d=0.59 
15 70.3% women with an average age 35.9 years and ranging in age from 16 to 72. One-way ANOVAs showed no 
significant gender effects. 
16 Primary Cause: χ2(1)=8.38, p=0.0038. Responsibility Rating: t(134.15)=3.42, p=0.00084, d=0.58; W=1502.5, 
p=0.00012. Causal Rating: t(133.92)=4.10, p=7.1e-5, d=0.70; W=1493.5, p=0.00010. Compensation: 
t(134.17)=2.02, p=0.046, d=0.34. 
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good or a bad driver had a significant effect. This suggests that the results of Alicke’s (1992) 
driver experiment are best interpreted in terms of participants inferring something about John’s 
driving ability from his motives, not as showing an independent effect of character on causal 
attributions. Further, while the results of our first two studies are in line with the responsibility 
view, they are at odds with the bias view: the bias view would predict that participants’ 
evaluations of Samantha in the first study should impact their causal judgments, as they impacted 
their compensation judgments, but they did not. 
 
  
Figure 2: Results of Study 2 showing 95% confidence intervals; histograms of responses 
shown above. 
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4. Lauren Alone Studies 
Most of the scenarios that have been examined in the recent empirical literature on ordinary 
causal attributions involve two agents that perform symmetric actions that jointly bring about an 
outcome. The Driver Case diverges from this insofar as it highlights just one agent, although the 
other driver is obviously involved as well. In Study 17 in Livengood et al. (2017), we tested a 
scenario that went a bit further. In the Lauren Alone Case, just one agent was noted in the 
scenarios and her action was described as being sufficient to bring about a bad outcome.  
In these scenarios, Lauren works for a company that uses a mainframe computer that can 
be accessed from terminals on different floors of its building. Though the company does not 
know it, the mainframe has become unstable, such that it will crash if anyone logs into it. Lauren 
logs into the mainframe and the system crashes. Participants were then asked to rate their 
agreement with a causal attribution—“Lauren caused the system to crash”—using the same 7-
point scale used in my previous studies. On a second page, participants were then told that the 
company learned that the mainframe was unstable and implemented a policy prohibiting 
employees from logging in. Although Lauren knew about the policy, she again logged into the 
mainframe and the system crashed. Participants were then asked the same question as on the 
previous page. We ran five versions of this case, varying the typicality of Lauren’s action (either 
relative to her own past behavior or the behavior of employees more generally). In each case 
participants tended to deny that Lauren caused the system to crash on the first page and to affirm 
that she caused the system to crash on the second page.  
In this section I report the results of three further studies using the Lauren Alone Case to 
test the impact of other features of the agent. In Study 3, I vary whether information is added to 
indicate that Lauren has a bad character and whether information is added to indicate that she 
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lacked knowledge and desire with regard to the outcome. I find that character has an effect when 
knowledge and desire are unspecified, but that the effect disappears when it is explicitly stated 
that Lauren does not know that the outcome will occur or desire for it to come about. In Study 4, 
I then test the relative role of knowledge and desire in causal attributions, finding that both have 
an independent effect, with knowledge having a notably larger effect than desire. The case where 
Lauren knows that the outcome will occur if she logs, does not desire for it to occur, but logs in 
anyway is explored further in Study 5, giving three reasons for Lauren’s seemingly contradictory 
behavior. I find that which explanation is offered has a dramatic impact on ordinary attributions. 
 
4.1 Study 3 
To test the role of other factors besides violation of an explicit injunctive norm in the Lauren 
Alone Case, I varied whether information about Lauren’s character was included (not specified, 
bad person) and whether Lauren was described as not knowing or desiring that the system would 
crash (not specified, lacks knowledge and desire) using a 2x2 between-participants design. To 
indicate that Lauren was a bad person, the following paragraph was added to the beginning of the 
non-normed vignette from the first condition in Study 17 from Livengood et al. (2017): 
Lauren lives alone in a secluded area by a small forest. Her favorite pastime is to set traps 
for animals in the forest. When she catches one, she brings the animal back to her garage 
where she keeps it alive for several days slowly torturing the animal in ways too 
gruesome to mention. She has done this with raccoons, deer, rabbits, and even the 
occasional cat or dog. Because she lives in a secluded area, however, nobody knows that 
Lauren does this and her colleagues at work generally think that she is a pleasant person. 
 
To indicate that Lauren neither knew that the system would crash nor desired for it to crash, at 
the end of the vignette participants were told “Lauren did not know that the system would crash, 
nor did she have any desire for the system to crash.” In each condition, participants were given 
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the same follow-up probe as in Livengood et al.’s Study 17 on a second page.17 Responses were 
collected from 309 participants.18  
Results are shown in Figure 3. Focusing on the first page, an ANOVA with whether 
Lauren was described as a bad person and whether she was described as lacking knowledge and 
desire as between-participant factors showed main effects for each, as well as a significant 
interaction.19 Planned comparisons showed that the mean response was significantly above the 
neutral point when Lauren was described as a bad person and her knowledge/desire was 
unspecified.20 But in the other three conditions the mean response was significantly below the 
neutral point.21 Most importantly, while causal ratings were significantly higher when Lauren 
was described as a bad person than when she was not in the conditions where knowledge and 
desire was unspecified, there was no notable difference between the conditions when Lauren was 
described as lacking knowledge and desire.22 Interestingly, on the second page when the norm 
was added, a matching ANOVA showed just a significant interaction effect between the two 
 
17 Although my primary focus in these studies will be on responses to the unnormed vignette on the first page, 
results will also be shown for the normed vignette on the second page. To further test this set-up, I replicated the 
first condition from Livengood et al.’s study using a between-participants design: participants either received the 
probe from the first page or a modified version of the probe from the second-page, removing reference to the system 
having previously crashed. Responses were collected from 82 participants (70.7% women, average age 36.7 years, 
ranging from 16 to 99). For the non-normed condition, the mean was significantly below the neutral point (N=41, 
M=3.12, SD=2.12; t(40)=2.65, p=0.0058, d=0.41; V=156.5, p=0.0068) and the mean was not significantly different 
from that found by Livengood et al. (t(82.968)=0.99, p=0.32, d=0.20; W=1377.5, p=0.37). For the normed condition, 
the mean was significantly above the neutral point (N=41, M=5.63, SD=1.74; t(40)=6.00, p=2.3e-7, d=0.94; 
V=584.5, p=2.6e-5) and, again, the mean was not significantly different from that found by Livengood et al. 
(t(89.317)=0.21, p=0.83, d=0.042; W=1245.5, p=0.97). 
18 59.1% women (one non-binary) with an average age 36.8 years and ranging in age from 16 to 81. One-way 
ANOVAs showed no significant gender effect for responses on either page. 
19 Character: F(1, 305)=10.01, p=0.0017, η2=0.030; Knowledge/Desire: F(1, 305)=6.14, p=0.014, η2=0.018; 
Interaction: F(1, 305)=13.99, p=0.00022, η2=0.042. 
20 t(88)=2.74, p=0.0038, d=0.29; V=1833.5, p=0.0072 
21 Character and Knowledge/Desire Not Specified: t(75)=4.15, p=4.4e-6, d=0.48; V=487.5, p=8.6e-5. Character Not 
Specified and Lacks Knowledge/Desire: t(71)=2.47, p=0.0079, d=0.29; V=719.5, p=0.0053. Bad Character and 
Lacks Knowledge/Desire: t(71)=3.65, p=0.00025, d=0.43; V=425, p=0.00027 
22 t(140.56)=0.61, p=0.54, d=0.10; W=2708, p=0.63 
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factors.23 While the mean response was significantly above the neutral point in each condition, it 
was lower when Lauren had a bad character and lacked knowledge and desire.24 It is unclear how 
best to explain this effect, and replication is needed given that neither view straightforwardly 
predicts it. 
 
  
Figure 3: Results of Study 3 showing 95% confidence intervals; histograms of responses 
shown above. 
 
 
 
What we find in Study 3 is that while character has an effect on causal attributions when 
Lauren’s state of knowledge and desire is unspecified, this effect evaporates when participants 
 
23 Character: F(1, 305)=1.69, p=0.20, η2=0.005; Knowledge/Desire: F(1, 305)=0.53, p=0.47, η2=0.002; Interaction: 
F(1, 305)=4.27, p=0.040, η2=0.014 
24 Character and Knowledge/Desire Not Specified: t(75)=9.05, p=5.9e-14, d=1.04; V=2107.5, p=9.2e-10. Bad 
Character and Knowledge/Desire Not Specified: t(88)=11.5, p<2.2e-16, d=1.22; V=3067, p=2.6e-12. Character Not 
Specified and Lacks Knowledge/Desire: t(71)=11.8, p<2.2e-16, d=1.39; V=2140, p=2.4e-11. Bad Character and Lacks 
Knowledge/Desire: t(71)=5.83, p=7.5e-8, d=0.69; V=1910, p=1.5e-6. Comparing the last two conditions: 
t(130.85)=2.32, p=0.022, d=0.39; W=3044.5, p=0.044. 
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are told that Lauren neither knew that the outcome would occur nor desired for it to occur. This 
suggests that the effect of character works via an inference to what Lauren knows and desires: in 
the absence of information specifying otherwise, people infer from Lauren being a bad person 
that she likely brought about the bad outcome on purpose. Again, this is in line with the 
responsibility view but runs counter to the bias view.  
 
4.2 Study 4 
Study 3 provided further evidence that character does not have an independent effect on causal 
attributions, but instead works through further inferences about the agent. In this case, the impact 
of indicating that Lauren is a bad person was nullified by specifying that she neither knew that 
her action would lead to the outcome nor desired for the outcome to occur. This suggests that 
specifying that Lauren knew that the outcome would occur and desired for it to occur would 
increase causal ratings. This prediction, along with the relative role of knowledge versus desire, 
were tested in Study 4. 
Participants were given one of four versions of the vignette from the first condition of 
Study 3, varying whether Lauren knew that her action would lead to the outcome (didn’t know, 
knew) and whether she desired for the outcome to occur (didn’t desire, desired) using a 2x2 
between-participants design. This was done by adding a short paragraph to the vignette. To 
illustrate, in the condition where Lauren both knew and desired, the paragraph reads:  
Lauren knows that the system will crash if she logs into the mainframe. And Lauren has a 
strong desire for the system to crash. 
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In each condition, participants were again given the same follow-up probe as in the previous 
study on a second page. Responses were collected from 327 participants.25  
 
  
Figure 4: Results of Study 4 showing 95% confidence intervals; histograms of responses 
shown above. 
 
 
 
Results are shown in Figure 4. Focusing on the first page, an ANOVA with knowledge 
and desire as between-participant factors showed main effects for each, with knowledge having a 
notably larger effect; no interaction effect was found.26 Planned comparisons showed that the 
mean response was significantly below the neutral point when Lauren neither knew that her 
 
25 70.0% women (five non-binary) with an average age 46.9 years and ranging in age from 16 to 88. One-way 
ANOVAs showed no significant gender effect for responses on either page. 
26 Knowledge: F(1, 323)=33.6, p=1.6e-8, η2=0.093; Desire: F(1, 323)=4.92, p=0.027, η2=0.014; Interaction: F(1, 
323)=0.22, p=0.64, η2=0.001. 
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action would bring about the outcome nor desired for the outcome to occur.27 When she knew 
but did not desire, however, the mean response was significantly above the neutral point; further, 
it was significantly greater than in the first condition.28 In comparison, when Lauren desired but 
did not know, the mean response was not significantly different from the neutral point; and, 
although it was significantly greater than in the first condition, the effect size was small.29 
Finally, the mean response was largest when Lauren both knew and desired, although it was not 
significantly greater than in the condition where she knew but did not desire.30 On the second 
page when the norm was added, a matching ANOVA showed no significant effects, although 
desire was borderline significant.31  
Study 4 suggests that, at least for this scenario, causal attributions are sensitive to 
participants’ perception of the agent’s knowledge of the likely outcome of her action, and to a 
lesser extent her desire to bring about that outcome. While the effect of desire was minimal in 
this study, it is possible that its role is stronger than suggested. One reason to think this is that in 
the condition where Lauren knew that the system would crash if she logged in and where she did 
not desire for it to crash, it is unclear why she nonetheless logged in. This might well strike 
participants as contradictory, leading them to draw a further inference. One possibility is that 
some participants might have inferred from her behavior that deep-down really Lauren wanted 
the system to crash. Alternatively, some participants might have inferred that Lauren wasn’t 
paying attention or temporarily forgot that the system would crash, which might lead them to 
think that she acted negligently. To further test this condition, in Study 5 I gave participants one 
 
27 t(84)=2.14, p=0.017, d=0.23; V=857.5, p=0.031 
28 t(78)=4.08, p=5.5e-5, d=0.46; V=1803.5, p=0.00011; t(161.98)=4.38, p=1.1e-5, d=0.68; W=2165, p=2.6e-5 
29 t(84)=0.46, p=0.32, d=0.049; V=1292, p=0.30; t(168)=1.84, p=0.034, d=0.28; W=3041, p=0.033 
30 t(77)=6.22, p=1.2e-8, d=0.70; V=2172, p=2.8e-7; t(168)=1.84, p=0.034, d=0.28; W=3041, p=0.033 
31 Character: F(1, 305)=1.69, p=0.20, η2=0.005; Knowledge/Desire: F(1, 305)=0.53, p=0.47, η2=0.002; Interaction: 
F(1, 305)=4.27, p=0.040, η2=0.014. 
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of three variations on the vignette in which Lauren knew but did not desire, providing a reason 
for her seemingly contradictory behavior.  
 
4.3 Study 5 
Participants were given one of three versions of the vignette from Study 4 in which Lauren 
knows that her action will lead to the outcome, does not desire for the outcome to occur, but 
performs the actions anyway, varying the reason given for her behavior. In each case, the reason 
was added to the beginning of the third paragraph. In the first condition, participants were told 
that Lauren’s boss told her to log in, that Lauren told her boss that the mainframe was unstable, 
and that her boss told her to log in anyway on threat of being fired. In the second condition, 
participants were told that Lauren wasn’t paying attention and logged in despite knowing that the 
system would crash if she did so. Finally, in the third condition, participants were told that 
Lauren’s job requires her to log into the mainframe, so she did so despite knowing that it would 
crash. Participants again answered the same question as in the previous study using the same 
scale, and they were given the same follow-up probe on a second page. Responses were collected 
from 204 participants.32  
Results are shown in Figure 5. One-way ANOVAs with condition as a between-
participant factor showed a significant main effect for responses on the first page, but not the 
second.33 Planned comparisons showed that the mean response on the first page was not 
significantly different from the neutral point when Lauren’s boss ordered her to log in, but was 
significantly above the neutral point when she forgot or when she logged in because her job 
 
32 Participants were 52.5% women with an average age 36.2 years and ranging in age from 16 to 87. One-way 
ANOVAs showed no significant gender effect for responses on either page. 
33 First Page: F(2, 200)=10.2, p=6.2e-5, η2=0.092; Second Page: F(2, 200)=0.48, p=0.62, η2=0.005. 
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required it.34 Most importantly, the mean response was significantly higher when Lauren either 
forgot or logged in because her job required it, compared to when her boss ordered her to log 
in.35 And mean responses for these two conditions were not significantly different from the 
corresponding condition in Study 4 when no reason was given for why Lauren logged in.36 
 
  
Figure 5: Results of Study 5 showing 95% confidence intervals; histograms of responses 
shown above. 
 
 
 
 The results of Study 5 suggest that Lauren’s reason for logging in matters when she 
knows what will happen but does not desire that outcome. Plausibly, desire might be thought of 
as providing a reason for Lauren to log in (e.g., she logged in because she wanted the outcome to 
 
34 Boss: t(66)=1.09, p=0.14, d=0.13; V=694, p=0.19. Forgot: t(67)=3.90, p=0.00011, d=0.47; V=1374, p=7.3e-5. Job 
Required: t(67)=5.21, p=9.9e-7, d=0.63; V=1569.5, p=1.1e-5. 
35 Forgot versus Boss: t(131.98)=3.45, p=0.00038, d=0.59; W=1554, p=0.00055. Job Required versus Boss: 
t(128.19)=4.17, p=2.8e-5, d=0.72; W=1448.5, p=9.7e-5. 
36 Forgot versus Not Specified: t(142.77)=0.011, p=0.99, d=0.0019; W=2697.5, p=0.96; two-tailed. Job Required 
versus Not Specified: t(144.96)=0.61, p=0.54, d=0.099; W=2645, p=0.87. 
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occur), but it is not the only reason that she could have. The difference in findings for the three 
reasons tested in Study 5 can reasonably be explained in terms of the responsibility view. In the 
condition where Lauren logged in because her boss ordered her to, one might think that her 
responsibility for the outcome is mitigated: she did what she could to inform her boss about what 
would happen and only logged in under duress; as such, the responsibility would seem to fall on 
Lauren’s boss, not Lauren. In contrast, when Lauren logged in because she wasn’t paying 
attention, one might think that she acted negligently; and, when she logged in because her job 
required it, one might think that she should have told the company about the issue with the 
mainframe, rather than simply ignoring it. 
Taking the results of these three studies together, one methodological upshot for work on 
causal attributions is that researchers should carefully consider what inferences participants 
might draw about the agents’ mental states and reasons for acting, as these can have a notable 
effect on their causal attributions. Given the impact that such inferences can have, and that the 
typical scenarios in the literature involve social situations and norm violations that seem likely to 
elicit such inferences, testing the scenarios without adequately controlling for what participants 
think the agents know, desire, or the other reasons they might have for acting risks conflating the 
impact of norms with other factors and could generate misleading results. 
 
5. Conclusion 
There is a growing consensus that norms matter for ordinary causal attributions, although there is 
a great deal of disagreement about why they matter. Each of the main accounts in the literature 
allows that factors about the agent who violates the norm in a causal scenario, beyond the mere 
fact that she violates the norm, are likely to impact causal attributions. There is disagreement, 
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however, about exactly which factors are likely to matter. Alicke’s bias view holds that not only 
do features of the agent’s mental states matter, such as her knowledge and desires concerning the 
norm and the outcome, but also peripheral features of the agent whose impact could only 
reasonably be explained in terms of bias. In contrast, our responsibility view holds that the 
impact of norms does not reflect bias, but rather that ordinary causal attributions issue from the 
appropriate application of a concept with a normative component. As such, we predict that while 
judgments about the agent’s mental states that are relevant to adjudicating responsibility will 
matter, peripheral features of the agent will only matter insofar as they warrant an inference to 
other features of the agent that are relevant. 
 In line with the responsibility view and against the bias view, the results of the studies 
presented in this paper suggest that information relevant to assessing an agent’s character matters 
but only when it warrants an inference to a non-peripheral feature, such as the agent’s negligence 
in the situation or her knowledge and desire with regard to the outcome. Further, the results 
indicate that information about an agent’s knowledge and desire both impact ordinary causal 
attributions in the scenario tested. This raises an important methodological issue for empirical 
work on ordinary causal attributions: researchers need to carefully consider and control for the 
inferences that participants might draw concerning the agents’ mental states and motivations.  
 Further, in presenting evidence that runs counter to the bias view, the present research 
also suggests against a recent debunking explanation offered for ordinary causal judgments about 
agents based on this view. Rose (2017, 1352) argues that the “discussion over actual causation 
should be liberated from any demanded conformity with the folk intuitions” and that “in the 
dispute over actual causation, folk intuitions deserve to be rejected.” But this argument assumes 
that philosophers working on actual causation are analyzing the ordinary concept. As such, if 
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ordinary causal attributions reflect the appropriate application of the ordinary concept of 
causation, at least with regard to agents, they cannot be reasonably ignored in pursuing this 
project. And the present evidence points toward this being the case, rather than the impact of 
norms on ordinary causal attributions reflecting systematic bias.  
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